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Abstract
The browser wars are probably the best-chronicled standards competition in recent history.  Yet
the standard lock-in model does not readily account for the dramatic change in fortunes of
Microsoft.  At one time it seemed that Microsoft would be go the way of IBM before it and fail to
catch the next technological wave in the computer industry.  However Microsoft managed to
capture the browser market, overturning Netscape’s initial domination of the market.  In seeking
to understand this dramatic return of events, the paper begins by outlining the key elements of the
Arthur model.  This is followed by a historical narrative of the browser wars that highlights three
aspects of this technological competition; firms’ strategic use of standards, users’ considerations
of initial set-up costs, and the degree of interconnectivity between product markets.  The paper
finally considers how the standard lock-in model may be extended in order to encompass these
dimensions.
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1. The Arthur lock-in model
In 1995 Netscape appeared to be running away with the Internet.  With a 90% installed user base
for its browser, Netscape was one of the fastest-growing software companies in history and the
darling of Wall Street.  Microsoft, by contrast, had virtually zero market share and many
commentators were suggesting it would go the way of IBM before it - a Goliath that was unable
to negotiate the new technological wave.  Today the picture is reversed.  By the end of 1997,
Microsoft had managed claim a 39% market share (DataQuest, 1997).  Microsoft continued to eat
into Netscape’s market share, causing the latter to lose money at an alarming rate.  Netscape, with
no other revenue stream, became the subject of a successful take-over bid by AOL.  In August
1999 Microsoft’s share of the browser market stood at 76 %, the total share of the Netscape
browser having slumped to just 23% (Statmarket, 1999).  How did this change in fortunes occur?
And to what extent can lock-in theory help explain these events?  These are the principal
questions addressed in this paper.  In this section of the paper we outline the Arthur model of
technological lock-in.  This sets the scene for a discussion of the Browser Wars in section 2.
Grindley (1992) identifies different types of ‘standards’ discussed in the literature.  First, there
are minimum attribute standards that cover basic product requirements for measurement and
minimum quality such as grades, health/safety and trades descriptions.  Second, there are
compatibility standards that define the interface requirements which ensure interoperability
between products when connected together.  Third, there are standard product characteristics; the
bundles of features that define a group of similar products (e.g. the WinTel personal computer).
To this list we should also add design standards; those aspects of aesthetic design which
determine the appearance of a product, its access conditions, and its ease (or difficulty) of use.
Grindley observes that, for a number of products and services, one aspect of standards may be
pertinent and so it is legitimate to restrict the discussion accordingly.  However, this is almost
impossible for ICT, where the various different aspects of standards seem, if anything, to be
increasingly interwoven.  One direct consequence of this, Grindley has argued, is a tendency
towards ‘open’ standards in ICT.
Arthur’s model of technological lock-in focuses on the third type of ‘standard’ defined by
Grindley: standard product characteristics.  While authors are apt to refer to ‘a’ formal model
when discussing Arthur’s work on technological lock-in, this is, strictly speaking, incorrect.  One
can find three different models in Arthur’s work.  Historically, the earliest model is a random
walk model with two absorbing barriers (Arthur, 1983).  The second model, developed in
association with Ermoliev and Kaniovski, is a Polya Urn model (Arthur, Ermoliev and
Kaniovski, 1984; 1987) while the third model is a 45° random walk model (Arthur, 1986).  The
majority of authors, when discussing ‘the’ Arthur model, implicitly refer to the Polya Urn model.
Arthur, however, appears quite happy to switch from one model to another.  Indeed in his 1989
Economic Journal paper he employs all three models in order to highlight different aspects of his
lock-in account of technological competition.  There are good reasons, it should be said, why
attention has focussed on the Polya Urn model.  Firstly, Arthur claims that the results generated
by the other two models are generalisable to a Polya Urn, thereby giving greatest weight to the
Urn model.  Secondly, and in no small thanks to the work of Ermoliev and Kaniovski, the Polya3
Urn model is the most rigorously developed of the three models.  Thirdly, and perhaps most
importantly, the AEK Strong Law (see below) is derived from the Urn model.
Following Arthur (1989), the gist of the lock-in model is captured by a formal adoption equation
in which an individual selects between two rival variants of a new technology (A and B).  This
(s)he does by evaluating the payoff (P) associated with each variant.  The payoff at time t is
P = Xij
 + r (nj
t) (1)
where  Xij is individual i’s personal preference for technology j and r is a term that captures the
increasing returns to adoption.  The value of r is higher the greater the number of previous
adopters of the technology (nj) at time t.  By contrast, Xij is an independent term indicating the
hedonistic value an individual attaches to a technology, regardless of the number of other
adopters.
The probability of adopting variant A at time t is
Pr{ XA
 + r (nA
t) ³  XB
 + r (nB
t) }
Following Bassanini and Dosi (1998), this can be rewritten as
Pr{ XB - XA  ³  r (nA
t)  - r (nB
t) }
= Ff [r (n A
t ) - r (n B 
t )]
 where  Ff () is the distribution function f
 t = XB - XA.
Arthur’s main theorem can be derived from equation (2);
Theorem:  If the improvement function r increases at least at rate e > 0 as nj
increases, the adoption process converges to the dominance of a single technology,
with probability one (Arthur, 1989).
This theorem is the basic result which each of Arthur’s models seeks to reveal.  The system will
lock in either variant A or B, producing a market monopoly.  However, and this is the point that
Arthur wishes to stress, when selection is frequency-dependent it is impossible to predict ex ante
which variant of a new technology will be the winner.  If the relative fitness of a variant depends
on population shares (including that variant’s own share) then the strategic choices of individual
buyers are interdependent.  Bandwagon effects can quickly spread as a result of changes in the4
behaviour of other adopters.   As a consequence, selection in the models is non-ergodic and
highly sensitive to initial starting conditions, the final outcome depending on the way in which
adoptions are built up.  Kirman (1997) notes that this path dependency depends on two features
of these models.  First, it can arise when there is an increasing size of population - the Polya Urn
model, for example, assumes an indefinitely increasing population in order to establish
asymptotic results.  A second factor is the strictly sequential nature of decision-making.
Bassanini and Dosi (1998) add that the AEK theorem only strictly holds when returns are linearly
increasing and there is homogeneity of consumer preferences (or at least the degree of
heterogeneity is small).
The combination of increasing returns to adoption and path dependency has a number of
consequences for market-driven de facto standards.  Arthur emphasises the extent to which small
historical events, (i.e. random and unpredictable) that occur in the early stages of a technology’s
history can fundamentally affect its development and diffusion.  Such chance events can, Arthur
stresses, easily lead to the selection of a sub-optimal technology.  This analytical result seriously
undermines the claim that the market mechanism will automatically select the variant that is
optimal for a particular set of preferences and production constraints
1.
2. A lock-in account of the Browser Wars
Following David’s seminal study of the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985), the lock-in account
has been applied to a number of product standards battles.  Arthur (1988) has discussed the
impact of small chance events (i.e. random and unpredictable) on the development of the car
industry.  At the turn of the century there existed three alternative technology options; petrol,
steam and electric battery engine cars.  Arthur provocatively argues that a key point event which
turned the competition in favour of the petrol engine was an outbreak of foot and mouth disease
in the US in 1914.  This shut down the horse troughs from which steam cars drew their water,
giving an important stimulus to petrol-driven designs.  Two other standards battles cited by
Arthur are the Sony Betamax vs. JVC VHS video recorder battle, and the IBM PC vs. Apple
Macintosh battle.  As with the QWERTY keyboard, there was a lock-in to a technology variant
which, even at the time, was widely recognised to be the sub-optimal alternative.  The lock-in
model has been applied to a number of other standards battles.  Lock-in theory has also become
popular in the strategic management literature.  Of particular note here are the collections of case
studies by Grindley (1992) and Schnaars (1994).  The empirical literature now covers a diversity
of product and process technologies, ranging from magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),
automated teller machines (ATMs) and CAT scanners to high definition television (HDTV),
cordless telephones and light beer.  As well as deepening our understanding of technological
lock-in, this body of empirical work has brought the theory to a wide audience.  At first sight the
Netscape-Microsoft Browser War seems obvious candidate for a lock-in study.  As well as being the
most chronicled standards battle in recent history, it has attracted the attention of the US authorities,
which have pursued a long and drawn-out antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft.  Indeed US and
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European media frequently refer to lock-in theory when interpreting the issues of this case for
their readership.  It therefore seems an opportune moment to test appropriateness of the lock-in
account.
A typical lock-in account proceeds in the following manner.  It begins by defining the product
under study, in this case the web browser.  It then sets up a ‘standards battle’.  A particular date is
given as marking t0.  At t0 there are n rival firms, each offering a rival variant of the product.  There
is usually little or no attempt to contextualise the battle beyond the leading protagonists (i.e. to
discuss the broader commercial, social or political factors that shape events) or to consider how
history prior to this date t0 influences the strategies of the protagonists or in some other way affects
the outcome.  Rather, attention is squarely focussed on the competitive strategy that each firm
pursues in order to win the standards battle.  There then follows a detailed account of how the
dynamics of increasing returns to adoption explain why one firm’s strategy was more effective than
its rivals and, thus, how the particular variant offered by that firm comes to dominate the market.
Let us consider what a lock-in account of the Browser Wars would look like.  The browser battle is
all but over due to two factors.  The first is the take-over of Netscape by AOL.  This followed the
serious financial difficulties faced by Netscape once Microsoft started to make inroads into its
market.  The second, and related, factor, is the shift in focus from browsers to portal sites as the key
strategic battleground for commercial control of the Internet.  It is therefore possible to construct a
historical narrative that sheds light on the factors leading to a victory for one of the competing
technology variants.  Furthermore, the web browser is a well-defined technological artefact.  It is
used to communicate over the Internet with Web servers using HTTP (HyperText Transfer
Protocol).  HTTP enables the user’s browser to pull up information or else to ‘surf’ the Web.  The
basics of the browser are quite simple.  When a user first opens his/her browser, the browser
follows a link that reads a document written in the HTML language and displays this in a
window.  For example, let us say that you wish to read the electronic version of this document
held on the MERIT website at <http://meritbbs.unimaas.nl/staff/windrum/.html>.  To access this
document your browser will use the HTTP protocol to send a network request for this file to the
web server where the document resides.  The Web server will then respond to your browser’s
request and, by following the HTTP protocol, send this document to your browser.  Your browser
can interpret the HTML in the document and is able to display it on your screen.
While an important part of the underpinning technology of the Web was developed in Europe, the
US quickly came to dominate and shape its commercial development.  Two US corporations in
particular, Netscape Communications and Microsoft, have shaped the commercial development
of the Web through their control of the browser platform.  Neither company was the first to
develop a commercial Web browser.  That honour goes to the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications (NCSA), who released its Mosaic browser in 1993. Mosaic was
superseded by Netscape’s rival browser.   The beta version of Netscape Navigator 1.0 was
released on 14th October 1994, with the final commercial version following on 15th December.
Netscape Navigator 1.0 represented a significant achievement, both as a technology and for
Netscape as a company.  Founded on 4th April 1994 by Jim Clark and Marc Andreesen, the6
company’s design team was able to develop and launch its browser within just six months
2.
Netscape 1.0 was by far the best graphical interface platform around at the time, both in terms of
its ease of use and its technical design.  As well as being able to load graphic images faster than
Mosaic (thanks to its innovative ‘continuous document streaming’ code), Netscape offered the
user improved features such as easy-to-use navigation and new text formatting options.  In
subsequent versions of Navigator the company would add Frames, coloured backgrounds and
many other features that are now considered a normal part of Web page design.  In addition to
having a superior product, Netscape effectively gave away Navigator 1.0 for free.  As well as the
beta test version being freely available, Netscape allowed companies and individuals to download
the finished commercial version of Navigator 1.0 from the Internet free of charge
3.  By giving
away a superior product, Netscape quickly captured the Web browser market.
The decision to give the browser away was a clever piece of marketing. Clark and Andreesen
were more interested in the profits generated by Netscape server software packages - for which it
charged up to $50,000 - than by royalties on the browser itself (Newman, 1997).  They were well
aware of, and drew lessons from, the example provided by the Microsoft’s Windows operating
system.  They knew that getting designers to pay for server software would require building up a
large installed user base, thereby locking the market into their particular Web browser. This they
quickly succeeded in doing.  By the time Netscape Communications Corp. became a publicly
quoted company in August 1995, its browser was one of the fastest-growing software companies
in history with a 90% share of the Web browser market.  Amid investor frenzy, its share price
rocketed from an initial price of $14 to $86 on the first day of trading, turning Clark and
Andreesen into paper millionaires.
Equation (1) assists our conceptual understanding of the Mosaic-Navigator battle.  While the
Mosaic browser had an initial advantage in terms of its installed user base (r), Netscape was able
to turn the market in its favour by satisfying personal preferences (Xi) for a superior browser
technology.  Indeed Netscape seems to provide a good example of a company that sought to
exploit the key principles of lock-in theory.  In addition to strategically planning to establish a
large installed user base, it has pursued a strategy of incremental innovation in order to extend its
browser’s functionality while at the same time enabling users to retain their core skills and
knowledges.  Surely Netscape, with an installed user base of 90%, had an unassailable position
and this would be the end of the story?  The answer, as we know today, was ‘no’.  Bill Gates’
famous ‘Pearl Harbour Speech’ signalled the commencement of a second Browser War on 7th
December 1995.  It was one thing for Gates to proclaim that Microsoft would become a leading
Internet player, it was quite another to realise this ambition.  Microsoft was a late market entrant
whose Internet Explorer (IE) browser was not on the market at time t0
4.  What is more, Microsoft
had showed little or no any interest in the Internet prior to Gates’ speech.  By the time it did act,
Netscape had been left plenty of time to build up a large installed user base.   Let us consider
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4 Netscape Navigator 1.0 was released in December 1994, version 1.1 in April 1995, version 1.2 in July 1995,
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some of the key factors, or ‘stylised facts’, relevant to the Netscape-Microsoft battle.  Thereafter
we shall consider whether the lock-in model helps us understand this second series of events.
Two aspects of consumer demand greatly assisted Microsoft.  First, users are loath to switch from
the first browser they come into contact with.  Once a particular browser is installed on a user’s
computer there needs to be a very good reason for him/her to download an alternative browser.
Of the 7,000 respondents contacted by the 8th GVU World Wide Web Survey in Autumn 1997,
72% stated they had never switched browsers.  81% of new users (defined as users with 12
months or less experience of the Internet) stuck with the first browser they came into contact
with.  The report suggests this rigidity is not due to difficulties in learning how to use a rival
browser or to differences between the product features offered of rival browsers.  Instead users
are, in general, simply unwilling to invest time in searching for, and testing, alternative browser
software.  Moreover, new users’ inexperience of the Internet appears to make them uneasy with
even the idea of downloading software (including rival browsers) over the Internet.  The second
factor working in Microsoft’s favour was the spectacular growth rate of the Internet, which
continues to double in size year upon year
5.  This provided ample scope for a late entrant, such as
Microsoft, to drive a wedge between the existing generation of users (who had overwhelmingly
chosen the Netscape browser) and the next generation of users.  Potentially, at least, Microsoft
could achieve parity in market share with Netscape within two to three years provided it could
capture the majority of new users.
There were essentially three planks to the Microsoft strategy.  First, effort was put into improving
the quality of its IE browser so that it would at least approach the quality of the Netscape
browser.  Second, Microsoft made IE 3.0 freely available to both individuals and companies. This
contrasted with Netscape who, by this time, was exploiting its market position and charging end-
users $5 for its browser software
6.  The commitment of Microsoft to establishing itself as a major
Internet player was such that it was willingness to sustain large losses in the short-run in order to
gain market share.  The sheer earning power of Microsoft meant it had no problem cross-
subsidising these activities.  This action alone may not have invoked the wrath of the US
Department of Justice (DoJ), indeed Microsoft could justifiably claim that it was merely
following Netscape’s earlier example.  However Microsoft’s strategy did not end here.  The third
plank of its strategy was to control the key distribution channels through which new users acquire
their first web browser.  Evidence brought against Microsoft in the US antitrust lawsuit indicates
it was well aware of the stickiness of user demand.  It was also aware that  most users were either
acquiring their browser in a hardware or software bundle, or else through their Internet Service
Provider (ISP) (Foley, 1998).  Microsoft therefore sought to use its power within the computer
industry
7 to ensure its Internet Explorer was the first browser new users would come into contact
with.
It was this third plank of Microsoft’s strategy that brought it into direct conflict with the US
authorities.  Pressuring the leading OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) to automatically
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7 90% of all PCs sold work under one or other version of Microsoft Windows8
bundle IE 3.0 as a standard part of their PC packages invoked the first legal proceedings for anti-
competitive practices in 1996.  The release of IE 4.0 prompted a second antitrust lawsuit, this
time brought by the US DoJ, in December 1997.  Here Microsoft’s attempt to integrate its
browser into its Windows95 operating system was upheld as unfair competition.  In addition to
hardware and software bundling, Microsoft had acted to ensure IE would be the automatic default
browser for subscribers to the major retail ISPs.  The distribution of subscribers is highly skewed
to four ISPs - America Online (AOL), Internet MCI, Microsoft Network and CompuServe -
giving them a very powerful position within the market.  Of these, AOL is easily the largest retail
ISP with 14 million subscribers.  Microsoft’s strategy to control this particular distribution
channel comprised two parts.  The first part involved its heavily investing in Microsoft Network
in order to establishing itself as a major ISP in its own right.  The second part involved striking a
series of exclusivity and cross-advertising deals with the other major ISPs.  In exchange for
Microsoft listing their services on its Windows95 Internet Connection wizard, the other ISPs
agreed to offer IE as their standard default browser.  A Senate Commerce Committee found
Microsoft guilty of putting pressure on the large retail ISPs in promoting its IE browser.  Yet,
despite the Committee forcing Microsoft to abandon its ISP agreements in March 1998, IE
remains the sole default browser offered by the top four ISPs (Newman, 1998).
This string of lawsuits were just a foretaste for the sweeping legal action brought against
Microsoft by the US DoJ and 20 states on 18th May 1998.  The central issue is again the extent to
which Microsoft has exploited its powerful position within the computer industry in order to
control the distribution channels through which users acquire their browser software.  For
example, DoJ Exhibit No. 233 - an internal Microsoft document titled “IE 5 OEM Marketing
Plan” - discusses how exclusivity deals were to be struck with the top 10 PC hardware
manufacturers in order to ensure the success of IE 5.0.  The same document refers to a plan that
would not only integrate IE with Microsoft’s Windows98 operating system, but virtually every
piece of Microsoft application software.  This, the DoJ argues, threatens to eliminate any
competition in the browser market because consumers will be unable to use many functions of
Windows with anything other than IE.  IBM, one of the few large ISPs still offering Netscape as
its preferred browser, announced in September 1998 that it would henceforth only distribute IE.
After examining Windows98, IBM strategy manager Adam Wong announced that “Windows
Explorer and Internet Explorer are meshed... If you’re in Windows Explorer [file manager] and
you want to launch [a Web page in] Netscape, that ain’t gonna happen” (quoted by Newman,
1998).
The DoJ lawsuit was billed by the media as one of the most important anti-trust actions in
history.  But they have proved too little too late for Netscape.  By the beginning of 1998 the
‘smart money’ was already riding on Microsoft to win the Browser War.  IE’s share of the market
stood at 39% in January 1998, up from 21% in January 1997.  While the number of computers
installed with Netscape grew by only 33% during 1997, the number installed with IE had nearly
tripled, indicating that Microsoft was indeed succeeding in capturing the vast majority of new
users.  Netscape’s problems were confirmed when it announced a fourth quarter loss of $88.3
million for 1997, bringing its total loss over the year to $115.5 million.  Unlike Microsoft,
Netscape could not subsidise these losses with profits from elsewhere.  The announcement of a
decision to axe 400 jobs in January 1998 sharpened questions about Netscape’s survival.  In
November 1998 the company was the subject of a successful take-over bid by America Online9
(AOL).  The take-over is likely to mark the final chapter in the second Browser War.  AOL is not
interested in selling browser software.  Moreover the lack of a standard browser platform, and the
market uncertainty which this creates, is detrimental to AOL’s main business interest, which is
the development of e-commerce.  The key attraction of Netscape for AOL was its Netcenter
portal website.  Netcenter’s 9 million registered users are mainly business subscribers.   This
compliments AOL’s 14 million subscription base, who are largely consumers.  AOL-Netscape is
easily the biggest portal on the Web - the site through which most people pass as they look for
information or buy/sell goods.  It has 50% more visitors than its closest rival Yahoo.  It is here
that the strategic battle for commercial control of the Internet is now focussed.  Again,
competition is between differentiated rival products.  Such differentiation is designed to ensure
the adoption of one particular technology variant by all end-users.  This raises a large question
mark against Grindley’s suggestion that there is a ‘natural tendency’ towards open standards in
ICT.  It is interesting to note comments made by Jim Clark, Netscape CEO, on this question;
“At some level, (open) standards certainly play a role, but the real issue is whether
there is a set of people, a set of very powerful companies, out there who don’t play
the standards game.  For the standards game to work, everyone has to play it,
everyone has to acknowledge it’s a game.  Companies such as Microsoft aren’t
going to sit around and wait for some standards body to tell them ‘You can do this’.
If your philosophy is to adhere to the standards, the guy who just does the de facto
thing that serves the market need instantly has got an advantage.” (Jim Clark,
quoted by Newman, 1997).
This suggests that firms will seek to capture an underpinning standard whenever this confers a
competitive advantage.  In the case of HTML this involved the privatisation of a previously open
and common standard.  This is not only true for Microsoft but for all firms competing for control
of the Internet.  It was Netscape, not Microsoft, who first used this tactic - adding its own
proprietary extensions to HTML – in order to win a standards battle.  Under what conditions will
firms choose to develop open standards?  Previous research based on interviews with
practitioners (Windrum, 1999b) suggest that two conditions have been important in Internet
competitions; a high degree of market uncertainty, and that no company (or coalition of
companies) has previously developed a core technology capable of becoming a de facto standard.
In the browser case the latter did not hold, with market competition focusing on the choice
between rival, proprietary alternatives.10
3. Empirical criticisms and extensions
Turning to the Arthur model of product standardisation, this model does assist our understanding
of the Mosaic-Netscape browser war.  However, it sheds very little light on the Netscape-
Microsoft war.  Microsoft did not stage a comeback via the development of a superior browser
technology.  Versions 1.0 and 2.0 of its IE browser were essentially licensed versions of the old
NCSA Mosaic technology and, as such, were inferior in quality to Netscape’s Navigator 1.0 and
2.0.  As well as being slower in its page display and image rendering, IE 2.0 did not provide
support for three key features of Navigator 2.0 - frames, plug-ins and Java.  Not surprisingly, IE
failed to make an impact on the market.  The release of IE 3.0, in the wake of Gates’ Pearl
Harbour speech, marked a significant improvement over earlier versions of IE.  However this was
achieved by cloning numerous Netscape features rather than the introduction of its own novel
features.  The general consensus is that Microsoft actually took a step backwards with IE 4.0,
which was poorly designed and overly complicated to use.  Matters have improved somewhat
with IE 5.0, although there are few that would suggest that IE 5.0 is a superior product to
Netscape’s rival offering.
In itself the inability to explain the outcome of the Navigator-IE standards battle through the Xi
term of equation (1) does not undermine the theory.  Indeed, as section 2 noted, a major claim
made by the theory’s proponents is its discussion of how inferior technology variants can (and
do) win standards battles through the externality r term of equation (1).  Unfortunately, in the
Navigator-IE case, Navigator started out with 90% of the installed user base.  With this size of
bandwagon already in place, Arthur’s model does not assist in explaining how Microsoft
managed to return from the brink of defeat.   Is it perhaps that we are simply are pushing the
model too far and applying it to a situation for which it was not designed?
8  The model, it should
be remembered, was originally intended to describe technological competitions between
contemporaneous and unsponsored standards that begin with roughly equal market shares.  It was
not designed to explain how late entrants use their control over distribution channels or some
other factor to overcome the first-mover advantages of an earlier entrant.  How can we respond to
this problem?  There seem to be two possibilities.  One is to jettison the Arthur model and look
for an alternative conceptual framework.  However this may involve throwing the baby out with
the bath water.  An alternative response is to try and extend the standard model in order to
accommodate the particular facets of the case.  Here we consider the second response.
Understanding the Netscape-Microsoft battle requires an examination of the particular demand
conditions that existed in the browser market between 1996 and 1998.  First, there is an important
distinction between the current installed user base and the rate of growth of the user base.  If the
user base is expanding rapidly, as it was in the browser market at that time, then an initially large
share of the installed user base - even a 90% share - is no longer a sufficient condition to ensure a
technology lock-in through r.  Second, section 2 highlighted the extent to which the influence of
previous adopters ni
t can be outweighed by other considerations.  We suggest that two changes
need to be made to the standard Arthur model in order to discuss the Netscape-Microsoft browser
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war.  To begin with, equation (1) omits the costs associated with acquiring and using each of the
competing variants.  It is therefore a utility function rather than a calculation of net payoff.  It.
There is a second issue regarding the definition of a ‘market’.  By integrating its browser and
operating system software, Microsoft purposely linked together what had been, up to that point,
two separate product markets.  This changed the dynamics of the competition dramatically.
Reducing the estimated payoff function (P) to a utility function is a useful simplification if one is
considering standards battles in which price differentials are not significant and other initial set
up costs (e.g. investment of time and effort) are approximately the same.  This was not the case in
the Netscape-Microsoft standards battle, however.  Expanding Arthur’s model (1) to incorporate
pecuniary and non- pecuniary costs;
P = Xij
 + r (nj
t) - [Ij + Pj]( 2 )
where Ij is the initial investment in time and effort required to acquire and set up technology j
while Pj is the pecuniary price initially paid for that technology.
Price (Pj) was a relevant factor at the outset of the Netscape-Microsoft battle.  While Netscape
was at this time charging users, Microsoft made its browser software free to the end user.  As
Microsoft began to eat into Netscape’s market share, the latter responded by also giving away its
browser for free.  Given that this action did not prevent the continued erosion of Netscape’s
market share, the events of the browser war cannot be solely explained through Pj.  Turning to
the initial set up costs (Ij) associated with each technology, we observe that the ability of
Microsoft to make its IE software freely available on all new PCs effectively meant the initial set-
up cost of acquiring IE became zero.  By contrast, users wanting to use the Netscape browser
needed to download its software over the Internet, incurring positive set-up costs.  The evidence
seems to suggest that users were quite happy to use whatever browser they happened to first
came into contact with.  Consequently Ij appears to have been an important factor in the
competition between Netscape and Microsoft.  At the same time this user indifference between
the two browsers - itself perhaps a consequence of their similarity in function and design -
suggests that Xij was not a key determining factor.  Moreover, the extent to which end-users were
quite happy to use whatever browser happened to come free with their PC (or else provided by
their ISP) also suggests that adoption decisions were was not so much effected by the installed
user base r(nj
t) as by Microsoft’s ability to ensure its browser was the one that automatically
appeared on their new computers.  This enabled Microsoft to drive a wedge between the old and
the new generation of adopters
9.
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control distribution channels.  Schnaars identifies three key strategies (that may be used independently or in
combination) by which late entrants can overcome the first-mover advantages of a pioneer; (1) offer lower prices
than the pioneer, (2) develop a superior product, or (3) use their market power to overwhelm a weaker pioneer.  It is
this third strategic dimension that similarly distinguishes Schnaars’ analysis from Arthur’s model.12
Turning to the second issue regarding the linking of markets, Microsoft sought to fuse its IE
browser with its Windows operating system software in order to link what had, until this point,
been separate markets.  Microsoft users are able to exploit an integrated browser that allows them
to browse the Internet in just the same way as they browse their hard disk, the distinction between
hyperlinks and files disappearing.  This approach once again reflects the familiar Microsoft
strategy of facilitating change by breaking a technological transition into a number of incremental
steps, allowing users to (re)build their existing knowledge and skills bases through a series of
software upgrades.  Clearly, the Microsoft’s objective was to exploit its market power in the PC
market to gain competitive leverage in the web browser market.  In order to accommodate this
observation, one can extend the Arthur model by expanding r such that it also includes the
installed user base of Microsoft’s PC operating system (nk
t).  The payoff associated with each
technology variant at time t then becomes
P = Xij
 + r (nj
t + nk
t) - [Ij + Pj]( 3 )
The result of introducing nk
t is rather dramatic.  In effect we derive a new model in which there
are two, coupled Polya Urns
10.  It is very likely that this new Urn model will have completely
different roots.  Most probably it will have just one solution - a monopoly for Microsoft.   This
recognises the sheer market power and financial clout of Microsoft in relation to Netscape, the
absolute size of nj
t being dwarfed by n i
t.  Regardless of the total share of ni
t commanded by
Netscape in 1995, it could not compete in the long-run given Microsoft’s 90% share of nj
t.
4. Conclusions: The strategic use of standards in the browser wars
Microsoft’s strategy in the browser wars not only succeeded in bringing the company back from
the brink of defeat, it ensured that its IE browser became the de facto standard.   A key part of
this strategy involved the minor differentiation of its browser software from that of Netscape,
sufficient to ensure that pages designed using IE cannot be viewed correctly by users with
Netscape software.   Such differentiation is designed to ensure the adoption of one particular
browser by all end-users.  This was the same strategy used by Netscape in its earlier battle with
NCSA.  The net effect has been the privatisation of HTML, previously an open and common
standard.  This calls into doubt Grindley’s suggestion of a ‘natural tendency’ towards open
standards in ICT.  Rather, the browser wars case suggests that firms will seek to capture an
underpinning standard whenever this confers a competitive advantage.  This is not only true for
Microsoft but for all firms competing for control of the Internet.
The other aspect of standards competition highlighted by the browser wars is the ability of a late
                                                
10  We note that Dosi and Kaniovski (1994) have previously considered the possibility of linked technology markets,
and hence coupled Polya Urns.  However they did not pursue a formal investigation of the properties of such a
model, or how it would differ from the standard Urn model.13
entrant to use its market power in one area - in Microsoft’s case, its control of the Windows
operating system - to gain leverage in another.  Indeed Microsoft has sought to merge what had
previously been considered to be two separate markets, in order to manage its own corporate
transition from personal computing to networked computing.  This coupling has proven attractive
to end-users.  As well as linking the two installed user bases, the bundling of browser and
windows software reduces the time and effort required to get connected to the Internet.  At the
same time, integrating Internet and standard PC software adds functionality.  The Internet is a
very effective distribution mechanism.  Giving away one’s software for free can be a successful
way of rapidly gaining market share, as first Netscape and then Microsoft proved in the browser
wars.  However the problem is to keep this installed user base.  In the browser wars, Microsoft
has sought to achieve this by developing an integrated browser that enables the end-user to move
seamlessly between the files held on the Internet and those held on the user’s hard disk drive,
adding increased functionality to both in the process.
We observed that the Arthur model – at least in its standard form - sheds very little light on the
Netscape-Microsoft browser war.  Microsoft did not stage a comeback via the development of a
superior browser technology.   Moreover, given the size of bandwagon effect enjoyed by
Navigator at the outset, the Arthur model would predict victory for Netscape rather than
Microsoft.  The paper discussed two steps by which the basic structure of the model may be
extended in order to accommodate the stylised facts of the browser competition.  The first step
involved an explicit formulation of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs associated with
acquiring and using each of the competing variants.  In the browser case it was the initial
investment in time and effort required to acquire and set up rival variant technologies which
counted, not price differentials.   Both pieces of software were offered free to the end-user.
However, by bundling its IE on all new PCs, Microsoft effectively reduced users’ initial set-up
costs to zero.  By contrast, users wanting to use the Netscape browser needed to download its
software over the Internet, incurring positive set-up costs.  The second step involved a
consideration of the extent to which cross-market effects, due to complimentary goods or the
merging of technologies, effect the competitive outcome.  It quickly becomes clear that, in the
presence of strong cross-market linkages, the impact can be dramatic.  A model based on coupled
Polya Urns will have different roots to a single Urn model and, consequently, will yield a
different solution.  Moreover, one would expect such a model to yield a solution in which there is
a market monopoly for Microsoft.14
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